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Approximately one year ago, the researcher became affiliated with
United States Arbitration and Mediation, a nationwide network of attorneys and
retired judges offering primarily mediation services for insurance and business
litigants. United States Arbitration and Mediation of Wisconsin, Inc. (USA) is the
local officeholder providing such services within the state of Wisconsin. The
researcher is the sole owner of this entity. Currently, our local panel of mediators
includes two judges and five attorneys providing primarily mediation services to
insurance litigants. Some of the insurance companies currently referring cases are
Allstate, American Family, Travelers, Liberty Mutual, John Deere and The Hartford.
This service business is a part-time endeavor for both the researcher as an adjunct
to a small law firm and the outside independent panel of mediators. Presently,
USA's function is to provide the business administration of this service. The issue
is whether or not this business can survive independent from this writer's law firm.
Currently, U.S.A. of Wisconsin, Inc. uses offices machines, equipment and space
provided by the law firm.
"Discourage Litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how
the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, in
expenses, and waste of time."
-Abraham Lincoln
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DESCRIPTION OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES AND SERVICES
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) are words currently in use to
describe a number of techniques such as arbitration, mini-trials and mediation which
involve the use of third parties to help litigants or disputants resolve their
differences outside the formal judicial system. Throughout the country, there is a
growing perception that the court system is not well-suited for every dispute. People
are recognizing that the delays, complexity, and expense of litigation often make
"justice" difficult if not impossible. This recognition has created a climate in which
potential and real users have sought alternatives to the court system. This national
movement has received the highest levels of support from our courts, bar
associations and major United States corporations. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
stated (Burger, 1982, p.2):
The obligation of our profession is, or has long
been thought to be, to serve as healers of human
conflicts. To fulfill our traditional obligation meant that
we should provide mechanisms that can produce an
acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the
least possible expense and with a minimum of stress on
the participants. That is what justice is all about.
The law is a tool, not an end in itself. Like any
tool, particular judicial mechanisms, procedures, or rules
can become obsolete. Just as the carpenter's handsaw
was replaced by the power saw and his hammer was
replaced by the stapler, we should be alert to the need
for better tools to serve our purposes.
Many thoughtful people, within and outside our
profession, question whether that is being done today.
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They ask whether our profession is fulfilling its historical
and traditional obligation of being healers of human
conflicts.
Today, I address the administration of justice in
civil matters, which shares with criminal justice both
delay and lack of finality. Even when an acceptable
result is finally achieved in a civil case, that result is
often drained of much of its value because of the time-
lapse, the expense and the emotional stress inescapable
in the litigation process.
Abraham Lincoln once said: "Discourage
litigation. Persuade your neighbors to comprolllise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal
winner is often a real loser -- in fees, expenses, and
waste of time." In the same vein, Judge Learned Hand
commented: "I must say that, as a litigant, I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of
sickness and of death."
I was trained, as many of you were, with that
generation of lawyers taught that the best service a
lawyer could render a client was to keep away from the
courts. Obviously that generalization needs qualifying,
for often the courts are the only avenue to justice. In
our search for "better ways", we must never forget that.
Example Case
In a major dispute between NASA, Spacecom, and TRW over
technical issues in a construction contract that threatened to delay the launch of an
important component of the space shuttle program, the executives were concerned
that during the previous year, their lawyers had spent an estimated one million
($1,000,000.00) dollars in discovery and depositions and the lawsuit would have cost
at least another million in addition to the costs related to a launch delay. Then one
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of the lawyers suggested a simple alternative to court: a minitrial. . . . rather than
go to court, the parties would lay the case before their own managers,and advance
their best arguments within the space of a single day. The managers would then
know the strengths of their opponent's case and the weaknesses of their own and be
motivated to settle, and settle quickly.
In February 1982, lawyers for NASA, Spacecom, and TRW sat down
to present their case before four people: the director of the Goddard Space Flight
Center, NASA's associate administrator for tracking and data systems, Spacecom's
president, and a divisional vice-president of TRW. They listened for five hours and
met the next day. Within a week they resolved not only the primary dispute, but
also several other matters pending before a NASA appeals board. (Henry and
Lieberman 1985, p. 7).
This speedy, inexpensive settlement of a fractious, costly lawsuit was
neither a miracle nor an aberration. It was an example of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), a movement characterized as a "quiet revolution" in the way
corporations and other institutions are learning to settle disputes without resort to
the courtroom.
The fundamental lesson of the NASA-TRW settlement is that practical,
businesslike methods exist for managers to resolve disputes quickly, effectively, and
economically. These methods will work for any manager who is willing to pitch in
and become directly involved in the dispute resolution process. The manager who
4
takes charge and maintains control of corporate disputes will discover that it is
possible to reduce the large expenses and the days, weeks, or months of precious
executive time eaten up by lawsuits.
ADR'S Fundamental Offering
ADR's fundamental offering is unique but simple: the business
manager or executive should take charge of disputes and play a substantial role in
planning, bargaining and carrying out a settlement strategy. Routinely referring
disputes to the legal department or an outside lawyer is insufficient and may be an
abdication of management's role of controlling the business enterprise.
Management should use their business skills and the art of negotiation.
ADR is quite new in this country. It first received attention in the late
1970's and became more widely known in the 1980's. But many of the techniques
used are very old. The Pacific basin countries, such as Japan have practiced
"conciliation" for centuries. Most lawsuits, perhaps as high as 90% are settled
without a trial anyway. So what we are really discussing is coming up with
alternatives that accelerate the settlement process, thereby saving the company's
business opportunities and avoiding the costs of discovery and litigation.
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A Business Executive's Perspective
Often a business executive will and should question outside counsel
about the pressures to litigate rather than settle cases and suggest ways that together
they might change that pattern. In a CEO's letter to counsel contained in a
Harvard Business Review article, the author points out (Fisher 1985, p.3-44):
Little work on settlement
It's fair to say, I believe, that although most
lawsuits get settled, your time is still largely devoted to
the alternative means of resolving differences, namely
litigation. Our judgment on whether to settle or litigate
may suffer from the disproportionate amount of time
that you spend on the litigation option. Together we
spend a great deal of time trying to prove the worst case
about our adversary's past conduct but little time trying
to structure a future arrangement that would be to our
mutual advantage.
You develop a litigation strategy but no
settlement strategy. You think at length about the best
questions to ask during cross-examination but you rarely
devise the best questions to ask in negotiating a
settlement. You have a clear idea of the most we should
ask for in damages but you have little notion of the least
we should accept in settlement. You formulate clear
arguments for why, when we are the defendant, we owe
nothing, but you arrive at no clear figure for the
maximum amount we should be prepared to pay in
settlement.
We corporate clients are probably even worse
when it comes to thinking about settlement. Once we
have given a case to outside counsel, we are likely to see
it as "their problem."
Can We Change Our Practice?
These diagnoses point to some remedies that we
should explore.
Foster a new working assumption
Could we introduce into your way of doing
business and ours the premise that it is in the interest of
all parties to settle every case promptly and fairly?
Litigation should be a last resort: it is better than
dueling but much more expensive. As soon as you could
prepare yourselves to do so, you might initiate settlement
talks with the other side - not because your case is weak
but because your client has given you standing
instructions to that effect.
Nor should you postpone settlement talks until
you have gathered all possible evidence and removed all
possible uncertainties. Even with the best of discovery,
litigation is always uncertain. Gathering data may well
not be worth either the cost or the time. Furthermore,
uncertainty may promote settlement. Depending on the
parties' aversion to risk, a modest and quick payment to
resolve a dispute in which neither side has invested much
may be an ideal outcome for both. Like an insurance
premium, it may be a small price to pay to avoid
uncertainty. And when we are the plaintiff, particularly
when we are business people whose time is probably
best spent in other ways, a bird in the hand may be
worth quite a few in the bush.
Presumably, if we clients make our wishes clear,
you lawyers can pursue our interests in settlement with
all the zeal that you now devote to litigation. What
general guidance could we propose, what working
assumptions might be most useful, to switch outside
counsel's pattern of behavior away from litigation and
toward the prompt settlement of disputes?
An advocate for settlement?
To improve the quality of judicial decisions, you
lawyers rely on the adversary process. You have
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convinced yourselves - and most of us - that it is difficult
for a judge to decide wisely without hearing both sides.
The chance of the judge's reaching a sound decision is
enhanced by having different people present the cases
for different courses of action.
Because we end up litigating more often than we
should, I fear that as a client I am making poor
decisions. Perhaps I, like a judge, would benefit from
the adversary process. Perhaps we, as a corporation,
would reach wiser decisions if we had one lawyer
develop the case for litigation and a different lawyer
press on us the case for settlement. Wouldn't that be a
logical application of the adversary process to which you
are so deeply committed?
There seems no feasible way to avoid emotional
involvement, partisan bias, and the natural desire to pass
the buck. If we have to live with these risks, shouldn't
we create a countervailing force that will give us the
opposing case clearly and persuasively? If a judge needs
opposing advocates to produce a good decision, perhaps
we too would benefit from having an advocate for
settlement to oppose those counsel who advise to litigate.
Overcoming the financial disincentive
I would welcome your suggestions for how we
might overcome the financial disincentive to settle.
I know of at least one law firm that will quote a
fixed fee for handling a case all the way through
litigation or until a settlement satisfactory to the client
has been produced. If the law firm is of high quality and
has a wide base of experience on which to quote the
fixed fee, I can see great advantages in this approach.
The law firm has an incentive to use its time efficiently
and, if possible, to produce a quick settlement
satisfactory to the client.(To be sure, because the firm
has little incentive to obtain a settlement better than the
minimum the client is willing to accept, a client in such
a situation has to be on guard.)....
How about awarding a contingent bonus for any
lawyer in the office who is able to settle a case to the
client's satisfaction against the recommendation of the
litigation department? (Such a bonus could come from
7
funds that otherwise would be divided among partners
in the litigation department.) Alternatively, maybe we
should pay your firm some kind of contingent fee for
developing a settlement proposal and convincing both
sides that the settlement is preferable to litigation.
Can you think of some way to reduce the pressure
on associates in your firm to maximize the billable hours
they devote to a big case? It is easier to compare the
number of hours that two associates have worked in a
year than to compare the quality of their work on
different cases for different partners. There must be a
risk - in other firms if not in yours - that you will reward
associates for spending more time rather than less in
accomplishing a given task. I am sure you can tell your
best young lawyers from your worst, but on the margin,
how do you avoid rewarding inefficiency?
We may want to get some expert consultant in to
advise us on how we might best line up the personal
financial incentives with the interests the lawyers' work
is intended to serve. Perhaps we should look more
seriously at other incentives such as prestige or publicity
for settling cases, extra vacation time, a bigger office,
more assistants, or whatever. Your thinking about this
will, I am sure, be helpful.
A two-track approach
It is probably impossible - as well as undesirable -
for lawyers to abandon the role of knight in shining
armor. But how about creating a second and parallel
role for lawyers: the problem solver. the mediator. the
conciliator? (emphasis supplied) In our effort to reap
the benefits of the adversary process, I propose that for
every major case we have one lawyer pursue litigation
and another (who might well be a member of your
litigation department) explore and develop, at the
earliest possible date, the best settlement option
obtainable. This "advocate for settlement" would be
expected to press on us the reasons for accepting a
settlement (or making an offer) and would provide a
counterweight to the litigator's partisan bias by pointing
out weaknesses in our litigation position.
Just as lawyers are capable or arguing either side
of a given case, obviously many are fully capable of
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litigating a case and negotiating a settlement of it. But
this does not mean that they should try to do both at the
same time. The psychological orientation of a general
engaged in battle is quite different from that of a
diplomat engaged in peace negotiations. While a soldier
should have little concern for suffering on the other side,
a negotiator should empathetically appreciate an
adversary's interests. The soldier-lawyer looks back at
the causes of the dispute and seeks to demonstrate and
vindicate the wrongs committed, the diplomat-lawyer
looks forward to the opportunities for reconciling
differences.
You may respond to this suggestion by pointing
out that having two teams work on the same case would
tend to increase rather than reduce legal fees. For the
time being at least, I am prepared to take that gamble.
My specialist in settlement might well be one of those
doing research on the case and helping others prepare
it for litigation. I do not propose erecting a Chinese
Wall between litigators and settlers. But I do think we
would be well served if your firm had specialists in
negotiation and settlement - perhaps people with
experience as mediators and business negotiators - who
were devoting their energies to trying to settle our
disputes quickly, wisely, and amicably.
This two-track approach should benefit both the
litigator and the settler. The litigator would be under no
pressure to pull his punches for fear that an unduly
adversarial approach might damage the chances of
settlement. And the harder the litigator pursued that
option, the more it would strengthen the hand of the
lawyer working toward settlement. It would be a classic
Mutt and Jeff - good cop, bad cop-approach, but with no
deception of any kind.
Of course, both lawyers would not have to be in
the same firm. I have thought that if we retain your firm
to handle litigation we might develop within the office
of our in-house counsel some experts in settlement.
Another alternative, which some companies have
adopted and which I would like to consider, would be to
hire an outside expert in settlement to work in parallel
with your firm's work on the litigation front. There are
negotiation experts who might be hired either to mediate
(if the other side were interested) or simply to generate
a settlement of interest to both sides. Such an expert
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might have full authority to negotiate on the
understanding that no settlement would be binding until
the corporation had approved. Before giving such
approval we would, of course, expect to hear from
litigation counsel.
Once someone is in charge of settlement, it is
important to develop a settlement strategy and quantify
in dollars the value of litigating vs. settlement.
Increasingly executives are opting for and Alternative
Dispute Resolution technique.
Dispute Resolution Processes and Techniques
The following has been excerpted from the American Bar
Association's ADR primer (Sander 1987, p.2), Riskin, "Dispute Resolution and
Lawyers" (Riskin 1987, p.2-6), and added commentary by this writer:
A. Adjudicative - Imposed decision
Adjudicative processes are characterized by distributive results,
sometimes called "zero sum" in the sense that a gain to one side is
typically a loss to the other. Adjudicative processes are also
characteristically based on response to, or selection of, a dispositive
position or issue of a party appearing before a tribunal in an
adversarial presentation. The focus is toward decision making and
opinion giving not negotiation,
1) Adjudication -- A third party, such as a judge, is vested with
power (i.e., distinguish adversarial positions of the parties and
impose a solution (i.e. judgment) affecting their rights and
responsibilities. Civil litigation is the most common example,
however administrative tribunals also apply.
2) Arbitration -- Borrowing heavily from court-oriented dispute
resolution, an arbitrator or arbitration panel hears evidence and
renders awards and/or decisions enforceable in courts of
general jurisdiction. Statutorily empowered in most states and
at the federal level, arbitration in less formal, may be quicker
11
and less expensive than typical litigation, and usually offers
certainty short of appeal. Entry into arbitration is usually
voluntary unless a pre-existing contractual obligation requires
the parties to submit to it. Such contractual obligations have
been held to be valid by the U.S. Supreme Court (Shearson
Lehman/American Express v. McMahon, 1987).
3) Private Jud~in& -- Known in the vernacular as "rent-a-judge," a
private tribunal may hear a matter like an elected or appointed
judge. Where employed, these procedures may be sanctioned
by statute and the private judge's decision is entered on the
docket of the court as judgment as if the case had been heard
by a judge of the court.
B. Consensual - Voluntary A~reement
Consensual processes are characterized by integrative results, often
hailed as seeking a "win-win" solution by which all parties may
successfully resolve a dispute to mutual satisfaction, if not gain.
Interests, rather than positions, predominate. Consensual implies
voluntariness and, typically, voluntary adherence to the solution the
parties reach. Unless reduced to writing and agreed to be subject to
enforcement as a contract, results are nonbinding.
1) Ombudsman -- An official is appointed to gather facts and
recommend solutions concerning a dispute. Usually, an
ombudsman is associated with an institution or organization to
facilitate resolution of complaints lodged against it.
2) Factfindini: -- A neutral party reviews a situation and ascertains
facts pertinent to it. Factfinding may be used to facilitate all
forms of dispute resolution, whether adjudicative or consensual.
Factfinding is different from the appointment of a special
master or statutory referee, which more closely approximates
the typical adjudicative process from which it depends. The
outcome is nonbinding but the results may be admissible in
court. This process is useful in resolving complex scientific or
technical cases, where the use of a neutral expert will promote
fast and fair settlement without strategic posturing that
sometimes characterizes the litigation process.
3) Ne&otiation -- Consensual negotiations should be distinguished
from settlement negotiations. Consensual negotiations usually
involve face-to-face discussions between the parties and/or
their attorneys with a view to accommodation on grounds of a
dispute. This is often a legal issue.
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4) Mediation -- is usually a private, voluntary, informal process
where a party-selected neutral assists disputants to reach a
mutually acceptable agreement. In some jurisdictions (e.g.,
child custody disputes in Wisconsin) parties are now required
to attempt mediation before they can go to court. During the
mediation there is a wide opportunity to present evidence and
arguments and to explore the interests of the parties.
There are three basic types of mediation:
Rights-based mediation is most familiar to the trial
lawyer. The lawyer may be involved either as the non-
partisan neutral or as a partisan representative. The
goal is to settle the dispute with attention to the
identified legal rights of the parties. Often called risk
analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of each side are
discussed with a view toward possible outcomes.
Interest-based mediation is more freewheeling with less
attention given to the individual rights of each party, but
with a focus on the interest or compelling issue of the
dispute. This is often a nonlegal issue.
Therapeutic mediation focuses more on the problem-
solving skills of the parties involved. The mediator may
emphasize the emotional dimensions of the dispute.
Often, the parties discuss ways of handling similar
conflicts in the future.
Within each of these types, a variety of styles of practice exist.
For example, some mediators prefer to meet with parties in
separate sessions or "caucuses." This is sometimes referred to
as "shuttle mediation."
A mediator's style depends upon the nature of the conflict, its setting,
the experience and resources of the disputants, and the background and training of
the mediator.
5) Conciliation -- Conciliation is a mediation conducted by a
passive neutral. An example of conciliation is the shuttle
approach to negotiation in which a third party bears
information back and forth between parties (e.g., an




Mixed processes, as aptly described, take on aspects of both binding
and nonbinding processes.
1) Med-Arb -- Mediation between the parties is initiated with a
view toward achieving an integrative solution. Failing that, the
process converts to an arbitration to obtain a distributive result.
An important, yet often ignored or discounted, element in med-
arb processes is the bifurcation of functions; the mediator
should not simply change hats, a different individual should be
selected to serve as arbitrator.
2) Mini-Trial -- Mini-trials are sometimes dubbed "structured
settlement negotiations" since they utilize a fairly formal format
in which mediation is based on adversarial presentation of fact.
Mini-trials customarily employ a three member panel, one
decision maker from each side of the dispute and one neutral,
who hear "evidence" and argument. The decision makers retire
to negotiate a resolution which may, if impasse occurs, be
mediated by the neutral. Mini-trial procedures are established
by contract which governs the process, appointment of the
neutral, the effect of a negotiated solution, costs and other
relevant matters.
3) Summary Jury Trial -- A summary jury trial is a court-annexed
technique to foster settlement once a matter is mostly or
completely through pretrial. An advisory jury usually six from
the regular list is impaneled by the court to hear attorneys for
each side argue their respective cases. Usually there are no
witnesses; presentation takes on the character of closing
arguments with offers of proof as though testimony had been
taken. The jury returns an advisory "verdict" based on the
summary presentation, typically the same day. Summary jury
trial is generally used as a predictive tool, to dispel unrealistic
expectations prior to a lengthy trial.
4) conditional Summary Trial -- Conditional summary trials are
an amalgamation of mini-trial and summary jury trial
techniques. A conditional summary trial is best described as
a mini-trial in which the role of "neutral" is played by the judge
or a magistrate. In an interesting variation, inability of the
parties to reach a settlement is followed by submission of
acceptable settlement terms by each to the judge, who picks
one or the other as better representative of where he views the
case to be going. This is treated as an offer of judgment.
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Mediation: The Sleeping Giant of ADR
"In the long run, it is likely that mediation - a process so far used
mainly in labor disputes and domestic relations cases - will be recognized as the
sleeping giant of ADR." (Henry & Lieberman 1985, p.3) While mediation has been
used in many cultures to resolve problems for hundreds of years, it has not been a
part of the Western legal system until this century. Mediation was first introduced
in this country in the 1920's to resolve the serious labor-management problems of
that time. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service was the first American
agency to officially use this process, and the FMCS is still a leader in the field. To
this day, the largest and most complex cases to be resolved through mediation have
been in the labor field.
Since the 1960's, and particularly in the last ten years, the techniques
of mediation have been used with increasing frequency in the area of family law.
The legal profession pioneered the use of mediation in divorce disputes, and that
field now boasts several thousand attorney and non-attorney practitioners around the
country. Mediation is becoming standard procedure in many family courts including
Wisconsin, which recently passed legislation requiring at least a first mediation
session before litigating a custody or visitation dispute (Wisconsin Statutes.
§767.11(5). 1988)
In the late 1970's, mediation began to be used as a settlement tool in
a wide variety of matters including landlord/tenant disputes, merchant/consumer
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problems, real estate conflicts, corporate and partnership disputes, and
employer/ employee grievances. Many cities now boast dispute resolution centers,
where community problems are resolved by volunteer mediators quickly and locally.
By definition, mediation is an extension of the negotiation process. In
mediation, the two or more parties to a dispute begin or continue talking with each
other in a way to facilitate settlement. This is done with the help of a neutral third
party, the "mediator". As an example, if a husband and wife are divorcing and have
worked out a property settlement but are still at loggerheads over custody, a
mediator will help them to continue to work together to come up with a solution to
the remaining problem. On the other hand, if for some reason the parties are
unable to begin negotiating at all, a mediator can be called in to get them talking.
Then the mediator will work with them to negotiate a solution to their
disagreement.
A mediator is neither a judge nor a counsellor. He or she will not tell
the disputants what they should do, nor will he/she make a decision for the parties
in matters left undecided. Rather, the mediator will work with the parties together
and separately to come up with their own ideas for a solution. The mediator will
encourage the parties to vent their feelings and concerns, will work with them to
develop options, and will reality-test these possibilities and hear the interests of the
other side.
The final agreement is solely in the hands of the parties. Both
attendance and settlement are purely voluntary in mediation. The mediator will
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work hard to insure that both parties state all their concerns and doubts, because
the parties' full participation in the process is the most important tool a mediator
has to help them reach an agreement. This same participation is the best insurance
that the agreement will be kept.
Because the parties themselves decide the outcome, mediation is a
cooperative process. There is no judge to determine who is at fault, who is winner
or loser. At worst there will be a stalemate. Because the disputants are still
negotiating and can look at creative solutions, they may reach an outcome that is
good for both of them. This is known as win-win or positive sum solutions in the
popular vocabulary. There are no formal rules of evidence in a mediation, and
therefore the parties can talk about their concerns and feelings in a candid and
problem-solving manner. Though the disputants may go into a mediation session
quite angry with each other and unable to see a positive outcome, still the process
is cooperative. Quite often participating in mediation will put the disputants in that
frame of mind as well.
One way that mediation differs from adjudication is that in mediation
the process is cooperative and the parties themselves decide the outcome (which
may not be to settle at all). In any kind of formal adjudication the judge or
arbitrator makes a final, legally-binding decision.
A second way that mediation differs from adjudication is that the
focus of mediation is on problem-solving for the issues at hand. Therefore, the
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parties can come up with any solution that seem reasonable to them. As an
example, in a recent Wisconsin case, a family run business found itself in a hostile
dispute between a minority shareholder older brother and the majority
shareholder(s) sister and younger brother whereby the majority wanted the
"nuisance" and "trouble making" older brother squeezed out of the business. After
two days of mediating, this researcher's organization, USA, facilitated a multi-
million dollar buyout. Such a resolution would not have been available in court.
Before describing a typical mediation session, it is important to note
that a preliminary question each mediator will ask is "who are the primary
stakeholders to this dispute?". This is not dissimilar to an attorney asking who
should be the parties to a lawsuit. In a process preceding mediation called
"conciliation", the mediator will usually talk to the people involved in the conflict.
In conciliation, the mediator will determine just who has an interest strong enough
to require them to be at the bargaining table. During this time, the mediator will
also encourage the parties to begin or continue negotiating if possible, explain the
nature of mediation, determine the issues in the dispute, and address any concerns
the parties may have. A surprising number of disputes are actually resolved at the
conciliation stage.
What actually happens in a mediation session? Attorneys will
recognize that just as there are many ways to pursue a lawsuit, there are also many
different formats in which mediation can occur. And, just as in a lawsuit there is a
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basic generic pattern, so too in a mediation is there one format that is used most
commonly.
The Joint Session
At the beginning of a mediation session the mediator will introduce all
those attending, and re-affirm the parties' agreement to participate. This is called
the joint session. The mediator will again explain the process, describe the flow of
mediation, and lay the ground rules. Then, one party will have uninterrupted time
to explain his or her position. This will often involve emotional venting, expressions
of doubt as to the good faith of the other party, and any facts that tend to prove
their side. It will also include a discussion of what that party wants. At the end of
this uninterrupted time, the mediator may ask questions to clarify any matters and
paraphrase the first party's points. Then the second party will have uninterrupted
time to respond, to vent, and to explain their problems and wants. The mediator
will allow each party to talk as long as necessary to tell their story. At the end of
this time, the mediator will clarify the second party's position. Often the
participants will speak to each other at this time and begin problem-solving.
The Caucus
The next stage of this generic mediation session is called a caucus. In
a caucus, the mediator will meet with one party alone, and then with the second
party alone. What each side tells the mediator during this period is confidential
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between the mediator and the disputant. It is not related to the other party without
the disclosing party's consent. Many mediators are amazed at the amount of
movement towards settlement that occurs in caucus. This is a time when an
employee will say "it's true that I came to work late frequently" and an employer
will say "I may have judged this staff person more harshly than others". People will
often confide in the mediator their responsibility in a situation, and begin talking
about what they feel is a reasonable settlement. Often, the parties will share what
they reveal in caucus to the other side once they have talked it over with the
mediator.
The Role of the Mediator
The following is excerpted from Riskin "Dispute Resolution and
Lawyers" (Riskin 1987, pp. 2-6) with added commentary by the researcher. The
mediator's role is to function in the following capacities:
A. Catalyst: As in a chemical process in which a catalyst facilitates
a result without direct interaction or intervention, a mediator
brings parties together for discussion and keeps those
discussions focused. In many negotiations, the participation of
the parties and the efforts they have undertaken toward dispute
resolution begin to sustain the process and keep it moving
forward; in other words, an investment in the process itself,
both in terms of time and money, makes that process self-
actualizing. A mediator should capitalize on the desires of the
parties to reach resolution and lend a constructive posture to
those discussions while maintaining neutrality and objectivity.
Most importantly, a mediator must listen.
B. Educator: A mediator must be thoroughly conversant with the
nature of the dispute, the interests of the participants, the
reality of their goals or objectives, and the likely workability of
proposed solutions. The parties look to the mediator to
provide a balance and subtle steerage in their negotiations by
virtue of his ability to explain to one party the positions and
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interests of another given his understandings of those factors.
Providing objective enlightenment is a key function of a
mediator in dispelling misunderstandings or polarizations which
can occur during active, hotly-contested negotiations.
c. Translator: Keeping in mind that the disputants engaged in
mediation are there because they face adversarial problems,
and because they have been otherwise unable to resolve their
dispute, the mediator must expect each side to present its
position employing value - or judgment-laden terms (e.g., "As
an infringer of my patent...", "When you stole my trade secret.
. .", etc.). Even the best intentions of a negotiating party to
present his case objectively can result in a dialogue which
comes across in a strident or accusatory tone. It is an
important function of the mediator to translate those
undercurrents of accusation into something the parties can work
with more easily, in the absence of discordant innuendo.
D. Provider: Information may be important or critical to creating
value or providing new insights the parties may use to resolve
their dispute. Likewise, support services may be helpful during
a mediation, such as clerical or administrative support. A
mediator can promote the ongoing process by having at his
disposal the necessary resources the parties may require in their
negotiations or at least be able to locate those resources for
their use while they retain their focus on solving the problem
at hand.
E. Bearer of Adversity: There is an ebb and a flow in every
negotiation. As parties bargain at interest and/or position
levels, expectations rise and fall. Face-to-face discussions in
which these expectations are frustrated can lead to counter-
productive results. Obviously, bad news must be transmitted
but, when the mediator carries the message, he can cushion the
impact and allow the party receiving that news the cathartic
effect of (figuratively) killing the messenger, to transfer hostility
which could otherwise contribute to or create polarized
positions. This can be accomplished while providing a safe
place to vent frustration and diffuse tension.
F. "A~ent of Reality": Unrealistic expectations more than any
other factor keep parties apart from the concurrence that leads
to dispute resolution or, indeed, any other mutual
accommodation. A wise mediator will be alert for rising
expectations which likely cannot be met and refocus objectives
toward a more obtainable goal. This can be accomplished by
risk analysis. A mediator should ask, "Tell me the strengths
and weaknesses of your case."
21
G. Scape~oat: Generally it is preferred for principals involved in
the resolution of a dispute to have an ownership interest in the
solution; it is proven that such an ownership interest facilitates
implementation of the solution better than cases where the
result is prescribed (as by a judge or other "outsider"). It
should also be recognized, though, that the principals involved
in the negotiation of a settlement may perceive that their
colleagues at the "home office" are likely to second-guess the
wisdom or cleverness of the result they have negotiated. In
such instances, a mediator serves the function of a scapegoat on
whom either or both of the principals may cast a certain
element of blame for a less than perfect solution.
H. Value creator: Integrative solutions are typically the product
of creative thinking. An important aspect of mediation is the
generation of options for both sides to consider to find middle
ground where each party can attain its interests. Unlike
litigation, where issues are sharply crystallized through pretrial
procedures to focus sharply on as few as possible, mediation
oftentimes becomes successful in direct proportion to the
number of issues or interests which can be developed and
shared by the parties. Perhaps no higher function is served by
a mediator than creating or finding options to allow the parties
to give and take or share in the benefits represented by them.
I. Closure: Once the parties have reached common ground, the
mediator can bring about closure.
LITIGATION COSTS
Businesses including insurance companies have been finding out that
just referring the case to outside counsel and "letting the attorneys handle it' will get
them very quickly into a sizable bill for services rendered without any end in sight
to neither the costs nor the litigation. Brian Muldoon in an article written for
Business Insurance opined (Muldoon 1987, p.35):
More than 95% of all lawsuits settle without a
jury verdict, but these settlements often come in the last
stages of litigation. The conventional wisdom used to be
that the best settlements are reached on the courthouse
steps. It was assumed the prospect of settlement was
enhanced by vigorously preparing for trial and waiting
for the opposition to wave a white flag.
The cost of this assumption is high. Formal
discovery is the most expensive component in resolving
disputed claims. On the average, as a recent Rand Corp.
study shows, the total cost of trial preparation exceeds
what plaintiffs receive as compensation.
Nationally, not only are the costs of litigation high, but in some
particular areas of the law, the litigation costs exceed the amounts paid out in the
actual claims. In Business Marketing, the writer, Steven Meyerowitz stated
(Meyerowitz 1989, p.78):
. . . corporations pay trial lawyers more than $20
billion a year, and more than 60% of every dollar spent
on product liability litigation goes to the lawyers, not to
the plaintiffs.
Litigation is also time-consuming, frustrating and
damaging to future business relationships. For one thing,
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it may result in undesirable publicity for one or both of
the involved companies.
It is certainly true in the insurance industry. One study has shown that
for every two dollars and seventy one cents ($2.71) spent on administering claims
only one dollar ($1.00) is spent on payment to claimants. (Henry & Lieberman
1985, p.64). Kathleen M. Cullen, who is the National Director of The Travelers
Companies Alternative Dispute Resolution program wrote an article in Risk
Management in which she stated (Cullen 1987, p.28):
Statistics show new lawsuits are increasing in
record numbers. In 1984, over 13.6 million civil suits
were filed in state courts. Additionally, there were
150,000 cases filed in federal jurisdictions. Considering
the fact that there is only one lawyer for every 350
Americans, is it any wonder that a recent Rand
Corporations study confirms only one-third of the
processing costs of litigation actually reaches the
plaintiff. Two-thirds of the $35 billion spent on litigation
in 1985 went to pay legal fees and transaction costs
netting the plaintiff less than $15 billion of the $35
billion.
Litigation is sometimes used as a business strategy. George Melloan has stated in
the Wall Street Journal (Melloan 1989, p.A25):
Corporate lawyers sometimes practice "strategic
litigation," just to tie up competitors in court. Tort
litigation has exploded. Given the old saying, "Justice
delayed is justice denied," there clearly is room for new
thinking about dispute resolution.
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ADR: A Cost Saver
Not only has the insurance industry discovered that it can save costs
by implementing ADR programs, but corporate America has taken notice. Lis
Wiehl of the New York Times has written (Wiehl 1989, p.B5):
. . . over the past two years, 400 corporations,
many of them Fortune 500 companies, have signed a
pledge to mediate or arbitrate before pursuing litigation,
according to the Center for Public Resources Inc., a
nonprofit organization in New York that circulated the
pledge. Recently, 60 corporate signatories announced a
two year savings of nearly $50 million in legal fees, and
costs, (an average of $804,000 per case) according to
officials of the center.
General Mills Inc., one of the companies that
saved money, will only enter contracts that mandate
mediation or arbitration of disputes.
We've reduced our litigation docket by two thirds,
and we've had fantastic savings in legal fees, " said
Clifford I Whitehill, the company's senior vice president
and general counsel. "unlike litigation, these alternatives
resolve our disputes quickly so we can get on with
business."
Insurance companies are among the most avid
proponents of private justice providers. Last year the
Travelers Corporation sent nearly 5,500 personal injury
and commercial claims to mediation or arbitration, an
eightfold increase over that of 1984. The company
estimates an annual savings of more than $4 million in
legal fees.
Mr. James Henry, President and co-founder of the Center for Public Resources in
an article written by Collin Nash for Business Insurance, stated (Nash 1988, p.15):
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ADR practices also eliminate other indirect, yet
notable, costs such as diversion of management time, lost
market opportunities and unwanted publicity by
providing a more "rational, businesslike approach to
dispute resolution."
Criticism
Observers of the ADR movement fear that two systems of justice are
emerging one for the rich, who can afford the luxury of selecting their own private
jurists and the public system for the rest. An example of the former appeared in an
article in Barron's magazine, entitled Rent a Judge (Scholl 1988, p.60):
Privatization of the courts may rework the adage
"justice delayed is justice denied" into "justice in a flash
if you're flush with cash." A case involving the actress
Valerie Harper, which was tried for three weeks before
a rent-a-jury as well as a rent-a-judge, costs the litigants
well over $100,000. Those expenses included the jurors'
$12-day compensation, $250 an hour for former Los
Angeles Superior Court Judge William Hogoboom, and
fees for the bailiff, court reporter and clerk.
Harper had sued Lorimar Productions and NBC
(later dropped from the suit) over her discharge as star
of the television show, Valerie, in August 1987. Initially,
neither Lorimar nor NBC cared much about a speedy
resolution, since both were being sued for monetary
damages. But when Harper sought an injunction barring
the network from using the name Valerie, NBC
suggested bypassing the public courts. Fearing that the
injunction might be granted, NBC proposed; a last-
minute compromise: let the network keep the name,
Valerie, for the rest of the broadcast season and, in
exchange, it would agree to have the case tried privately.
(Lorimar went along reluctantly, after failing to persuade
NBC to change the name of the show instead.)
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A little more than a year later, the dispute was
over, with the rent-a-jury awarding Harper $1.4 million
in damages, plus a share of profits from the show.
"My career was on hold, so rent-a-judge worked
great for me," says Harper. "But, my God, why should
anyone who can't afford it have to wait six years?" Her
lawyer, Barry Langberg, agrees, "The process works
exceptionally well, and it's a terrible shame that it's
necessary," says Langberg, the advocate in several
privately-adjudicated suits.
Speed is one of the strongest arguments for rent-
a-judge. Endless numbers of pre-trial motions aren't
part of the private adjudication system, which attracts
litigants honestly interested in resolving disputes quickly.
The past President of the American Bar Association, Robert Raven
expressed his concern in an U.S. News and World Report Article (Gest & Hawkins
1988, p.56):
. . . the trend has raised the specter of "a two-
tiered system of justice in which those able to afford
private judges abandon the public system, leaving it to
the poor and to those accused of crimes," says American
Bar Association President Robert Raven.
The ripples of concern could prompt some
reaction. ABA President Raven asking a panel to study
the question of two-tier justice system. Alabama Chief
Justice C.C. Torbert notes that "rent-a-judge is taking the
pressure off reforming the system." He worries that
when legislators are asked to aid the courts, "they" say
the private boys have taken over, and we don't need to
fund you." Which could suit dispute-weary corporations
just fine. For them,spending big money on judges who
rapidly solve their problems seems better than racking
up huge legal bills in the odyssey for justice.
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The Wall Street Journal has found one operator of an ADR service, Mr. Jay D.
Seid of Judicate, who disagrees with the criticism that private courts constitute
justice for the rich and stated (Melloan 1988, p.A25):
"Many of our clients are low-income people. For
an insurance company to get a dollar to a plaintiff in a
normal case, it's going to cost them two dollars out of
pocket because of delays, litigation costs and court fees.
If this system works right, you can get more money to
the plaintiff with less cost to the defendant and
everybody benefits."
Also, it's important to note that in mediation, the mainstay ADR
technique, the final outcome still rests with the disputing parties and not the
mediator. In a mediation, the parties always retain the right to walk away and go
back to litigation. They control the outcome.
Growth Industry
With growing demand in a variety of market segments, private ADR
service providers have commenced business operations. The writer of a New York
Times article stated (Wiehl 1989, p.B5):
"Spurred by corporations impatient with clogged
courts and the high cost of litigation, more than 50
organizations are now providing mediators whose
specialty is resolving disputes and arbitrators whose
decisions are binding. Some companies even employ
retired judges to preside over private trials.
"Five years ago there were few, if any, for-profit
providers of this kind," said Prof. Frank E. A. Sander of
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Harvard Law School, who is chairman of the American
Bar Association's committee on dispute resolution.
"Now, driven by corporate demand, alternatives to
litigation have become big business."
Even though some for profit organizations seem to be thriving, one
company that went public didn't do so well as reported in Barron's Dec. 19, 1988
issue (Scholl 1988, p.29):
"It's trendy and even intellectually appealing, but
the private-judging movement is taking longer to catch
on than Judicate, among others, predicted. After the
company went public in 1985, a unit consisting of one
common share and a warrant to purchase a share sold
for $2.50. The units got as high as $5.75 in early 1986,
but they have since dropped to around $2.50. Last May,
the board of directors forced Judicate's founder and
president, Alan B. Epstein, to resign. It was a classic case
of a brainy entrepreneur failing to manage his company
adequately, according to people familiar with the
company. Perhaps Judicate's biggest problem was its
attempt to offer rent-a-judge services in all 50 states
from the start. 'They marketed an idea and couldn't
deliver,' is the assessment of one observer..."
The American Arbitration Association reports that in 1976 there were 4,093
commercial cases filed and ten years later the number had more than doubled to
9,311. (Raven, 1988, p.2)
The researcher's ADR service organization, United States Arbitration
and Mediation of Wisconsin, Inc., is part of a nationwide network of private
attorneys and retired judges linked together by licensing or franchise agreements
with its home office in Seattle, Washington. Each locale has an administrative
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office and usually a panel of mediators. See Appendix A for a more detailed
description. The way most of these businesses promote is through educational
seminars, newsletters, articles and finely targeted ads in professional journals. See
Appendix B for a sample.
OPPORTUNI1Y STATEMENT
The main opportunity presented is to determine whether or not there
is a sufficient level of business available to permit a local stand alone ADR service
provider which is not subsidized by this writer's law firm.
ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A restatement of the foregoing opportunity statement could be framed
in terms of a "go" decision in favor of establishing an independent operating entity
or a "no go" decision in favor of retaining the operating entity under the umbrella
of the researcher's law firm. Normally, a start up business encounters heavy costs
of equipment acquisition necessary to produce. In the instant case, the usual
equipment needed such as word processing, printing, photocopying, and telephone
were already in place, including the office space. Thus with the exception of
stationery, brochures, franchise fees and a new incoming telephone line, the costs of
start up were non-existent.
The way this service is sold is first and foremost through education,
usually seminars of two to four hours each to the claims department of insurance
companies to get referral cases. Then one on one, lawyer to lawyer by telephone
to convince the complainant's lawyer to agree to the mediation process. Additional
educational seminars were recently given to 110 of the Milwaukee Bar Association's
trial lawyers in an effort to encourage them to become volunteer mediators to assist
in the resolution of cases as referred by several Milwaukee County Circuit Court
civil judges during what has now been dubbed, Settlement Week. These educational
efforts directly increase the awareness of the mediation process and indirectly sell
the service.
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In an effort to employ what has been described as the "... heart of
modem strategic marketing ... STP marketing - namely segmenting, targeting, and
positioning ..." (Kotler 1988, p. 279) A major thrust to penetrate the targeted
insurance industry segment of the ADR business was commenced several years ago
by USA national. Local efforts began two years ago by utilizing newsletters and
seminars. However, recent emergence of a start-up competitor known as Resolute,
which uses retired judges has prompted our local firm to hire a part-time
commissioned salesman to make direct and frequent interpersonal contacts with
insurance claims adjusters. As of this writing, its uncertain as to whether such a
traditional sales approach will prove fruitful enough to move USA of Wisconsin
closer to being an independent operating entity. Additional efforts to tap into
the insurance industry segment have been made by approaches to the State of
Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner regarding the possibility of handling some of the
many consumer complaints filed against insurance companies through the Insurance
Commissioner's office.
An alternative would include a more heavily advertised campaign.
However, the experience of other officeholders in the nation has been that general
advertising has been ineffective. This service seems to be sold only on a case by
case basis after each corporate entity approves of the procedure as a matter of
policy and then elects to authorize its claims personnel on a selective basis to use
the service.
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Other potential markets include corporate disputes, both against each
other and from within, family disputes, real estate and government programs. Given
USA's national directive to concentrate on the insurance industry, efforts to
penetrate these other areas have not yielded sufficient repeat business to warrant
much local effort. These markets will gradually open up after ADR gains
acceptance.
Most of the above nonfinancial considerations seem to support a "no
go" decision. However, there are some nonfinancial factors which would support a
"go" decision. Some of these include the perhaps negative perception by users and
potential users that the business is not successful enough to sustain itself as an
independent operating entity. Also there are small but growing administrative
problems that may adversely affect the law firm and USA as they are difficult to tell
apart when operating. One subtracts from the time devoted to the other. For
example, the law firm charges its clients on an hourly rate and USA charges on a
flat rate plus an hourly rate for outside mediators. Thus, the administrative work
spent on USA diminishes the number of hours available for billing to clients of the
law firm. Only an independent operation could resolve these problems.
Financial Performance
Revenue is generated by charging an administrative fee, currently
$290.00 per case, and an hourly rate for the mediator's time, currently $120.00 per
hour. The reseacher's administrative agency, United States Arbitration and
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Mediation of Wisconsin, Inc. (USA) retains $20 to $30 of the hourly rate fees and
pays it's mediators $90 to $100 per hour as independent contractors. Payments to
the mediators are shown as costs of operations on the statement of operations for
USA. (Appendix C)
The average case takes about 3.5 hours of time so the average
breakdown per case is as follows:
Administrative fee: $290.00
Hourly Fees (3.5 x $120) $420.00
TOTAL BILLED TO USER: $710.00
Total USA revenue $710.00
Less cost of mediator
(3.5 x $90) ($315.00)
GROSS PROFIT PER CASE: $395.00
In 1988, the first full year of operation, total revenue was $48,123.84, cost of
operations (payments to mediators) was $21,969.34 leaving a gross profit of
$26,154.50. (See Appendix C) This researcher was able to draw $12,000.00 as
compensation in the first year and make a contribution to a retirement plan in the
sum of $1800.00.
Ten percent (10%) of Administrative fees is paid to the national
organization's home office in Seattle, Washington. This is listed as an expense along
with other minor expenses listed in the statement of operations. After expenses the
35
business showed a net profit before taxes of $1,669.49 for the year ended Dec. 31,
1988.
In contrast to the above, if an independent operation were set up, two
major operating expenses would be incurred: rent and an administrative assistant's
salary of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00). Given the current volume of
business, these two expenses alone would place the business in a substantial net
operating loss position (see Appendex D) not to mention the need for additional
capital outlay costs to acquire office equipment. Thus, from a financial standpoint,
it appears that, absent a substantial increase in gross sales, a "no go" decision for the
forseeable future is the logical choice.
CONCLUSION
Although, the future seems bright, with the emergence of Alternative
Dispute Resolution techniques finding new applications in insurance and business,
the success of the business will depend on the quality of the service to insure its
continued growth and silence the skeptics. The best way to accomplish this is to
allow the service to find its own level of success while providing it with the support
of a law firm's staff and equipment. Thus, for the foreseeable future, United States
Arbitration & Mediation of Wisconsin, Inc. should remain a part time adjunct to
this researcher's law firm.
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APPENDIX A
USA BROCHURE
In addition to offering arbitration and mediation, theserv-
ices offered by USA offices are nexibleandmaybecusto~d
to fit a particular situation. Someexamples:
CLASS ACTION ADMINISTRATION - Services include
sendingout claim fonus, screeningclaims, mediation,arbitra-
tion,· and keeping statistics.
SPECIALIZED INDUSTRY PROGRAMS - USA .has
developed customized programs for the insurance and COIl-
struction industries.
FACT FINDING - An independent investigation of a con- '
met, followed by a report of the (mdings, and a recommenda-
tion.
MINI-TRIAL - An abbreviated presentationola case tha.t is
viewed. by. representatives of all parties. Mini-trials have
proven effective in complex cases.
REFEREE - Many state statutes anow. the parties to a
lawsuit to select a referee to hear their case. The referee sits
as a judge, a .court trial is held, and. the referee renders a
formal court decision.
CONSULTING SERVICES - USA is available to review
and improve customer relations and intemalgrievance·proce-
dures; identify potential conflict situations; and train manag-
ersand employees as needed.
EDUCATION & TRAINING
USA offices have a very active involvement in educational
services. Such services include seminars, speakers, and a
library of arbitration and mediation •related books, articles
and vi.deo-tapes.
USA offices also offer training in the techniques of dispute
resolution.





ttl must say that, as a litigant, I
should dread a lawsuit beyond
almost anything else short ofsick-
ness and death. »










USA. Selected By Manvme Tmst
DR
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DepattDlent of·Agdculture
seJedslJSA
1beU.S.Department of Agriculture, through the F
Home,' Administration . (FniHA), recently selected
Louisville Office to operate a farm foreclosure mediation
gram in the State of Tennessee. There were·36 otherbi' '
and the contract was·,theftrStof itsldnd8nmt~~:;·:~,~·,
Agricult~~redftAct reqWreslenders.including the.,.. :.'
to'mediate:fatmloans·~fore forecJ.osing. The mediatiot$'
be attended by the debtor and all creditors, witb2S0-3C)Q:'
expected,~ Tennessee the fIrst year. For more info .,
contaet:Ted Spiegel, United States Arbitration Mi
Inc., Two Paragon Centre, SUite 130, 6040 DutchmaDs
Louisville,KY 40205; 1-800-562-1379. .
The stated goal of tbe Trust .is, to settle' claiDl$,~t.t'ialY
liti8ation.• A claimant"must ftrSt flle a Proof ofaaitPWjUJ
·Trust and make an effortto reachsettlement.1fsu¢1t>',·,
sionsare unsuccessful. theelaimant retains ~riabf~·.:,
to court. They may also proceed to use variousforms o~ "
native dispute resolunon"including:. '.
Neutral EvaIuation:A .' non-binding. decision by ,an ....~....,'=- ".'
afterwrit~eIlsubmissions·bytlle.parties;
Mediatipn: A non-bindinasettlementdiscussion withthe.aid
of a neutral expert. .' ... ' '. ....
Arbitration:·A fmal, binding decision.rendered ·bX•.a~
expert after a hearing. Somecases maybe arbitrateduPonoatt-;,(·
written submissions. and some may involveordy'., t.· '.
decisions......· '" '. ..•.. ..,' "'::"'1
Analtemative·.dispute 'resolution procedUres ~:"ff••:;..;i\2
free-of-charsetoclaimants. The goals of the alt' , '. " '
dispute resolution procedmes are to~evefairresol .
daimsasquicklyas' possible, and to minimize tran .'
and court cOsts to the Trust and:tbeclaimants. .... '.,
In Noven1J;>er, 1988, after a competitive l>iddingpr,
with the concurrenceofd.unants' attorneys, theT .. , ,
edtbecol1tractt0adriUnister ADR'services,toUS~
help· develop,propmlt'foQXlS and procedures, wiD
qualified neutrals'around the.country,and·.wiU pr ,
QIse"prooessing includesU1lking with claimants an4:,•.
aboutalten1ative .dis~ .• reso1ution •procedUl'~'
neutrals, schedulinacases, maUuainiDlstatistics, and..
overseeinsthe ADRproceedings. '.. . ....
In operating the Manville TrustADR program.·~ ,~"
draw upon its experience gained fromde~ianirll·
administering a'~es ,of consumer protection class, ,
operatin&tbeWashington State Lemon Law Arbitrati
gram, and ..providina a bish~volume,nationwide,···m




TheManville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (Trust) is the
irst product Hability Trust ofits kind. Itis'charged with set-
~aU valid asbest~hea1thcl~ against the Manville Cor-
-oration (forrnezly :JOhns-Manville).. The, .Trust recently
electedUnitecl States Arbitrati()n .& Mediation to administer
alt~tive dispU~r~lution· services involvinssuchdaims.
F()Bo~,abatr•.oflawsuitsCharging Manville with per-
onal>·injUJ:'Y' stemmins from its prodllCtion .<?f .~bestos,· .. the
ompanysouptprotection under Cbapterl1 inAugust, 1982.
Uthe time off~forChapter11 protection, the company
lad .approximately·· 1',000< pendina .lawsuits. Manville, with
haut 52.0 billion in assets,became the most solvent corpora-
io~ in.history to seek banktuptcyprotection.
After four years of intenseJiegotiatioDS,the Trust was
stablished .as the .vehicle ·to '. settle· cases .with valid Manville
lSbestoshealth claimaDts. Asbestos.relateddisease may take
lp to30yeaFS to manifest symptoms. Therefote,itis'diffieult
o estbDate.bow many people were actually .inJured by
lSbestQS, oriceknownasa mirade;fitier.. 1be'aetualnumberof
:laimants 'may.rangefroml~.tXX).200~OOO~·
On· .. Novernber·28·~ .... l988,:as"PIl1,OfManville's.eJ1lergence
rom Chapter ... 11 Bankruptcy..pr0teeti0Dt...theTrustAgteement
vaseonsumrnated,·.. allowinl·then-ustto~-eom~
'aIid;Manyille.victims~ Ftmdib8.for·the~Trust:~mes-rrOD1 a
'ari~ of sources,jn¢ludiDsinsUJ'8ll~,settletpents.ClShfrom '
vIan~eCorporation, .SO"o()fM~$CommonStQCk,
_viDe·' 'Preferred, Stock, .bonds and .. notes.····.from.· Manville,
vfanville .. ·· profit sharing" and, ···inCome· 'ftom-' invested funds. .
jstirluttedTrust resources are approximately $3.0 billion.
CANAD~~~K
PROGRl\M······BEGINS
t$ts intefQationalaffi1iatet Jntti'DationalDispute aesolU- .
iOQ,·LTD., is pleased to .announce the formation of Arbitra-
~ion·4tMediationServiceof .CaMdat·· LTD. Established by
7{eD~known '·.insutance .. attorney .. Larry .H..Gilbertson.end'Ws
lSSOCiate8t ..whh..'headq_ers.in.1~ODtoitheor~on ... is
lOwavaUable>toprovjdemedil\tiQnI.bitratiori.,$«vi~ for
x>mmerclal and' tort·cases tbroUahout··Canada. A·'fmt-rate
)88el.ofmediatofS81ld ,arbitrators has .beeI1.assemblc:d, .and
~• GilbertsOn recently,hosted' an introductory. seminar· that
NaSattended'byapproximateIy l00ins~company,
·epresentatives. TheraS! cases are currently beiQ.a~oceSsed.
In the near future, Mr. GDbertsonwillbeestablishiJls local
)ffices throughoutC8nada... For .' moreinfonnationcontaet:
Larry Gilbertson, Arbitration" Mediation Services (ADR)
~ada, Limited, Suite 1006, III ·Ric!unond·.··Street West,











Cash in bank - General














Note payable to Daniel
A. Noonan & Associates,
S.C.
LONG TERM LIABILITIES





































































































Total Operating Expenses $ 44,485.01
Net Operating Loss ( $ 18,330.51)
Net Loss ( $ 18,330.51)
